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Abstract—Today’s routing protocols critically rely on the
assumption that the underlying hardware is trusted. Given
the increasing number of attacks on network devices, and
recent reports on hardware backdoors this assumption has
become questionable. Indeed, with the critical role computer
networks play today, the contrast between our security
assumptions and reality is problematic.
This paper presents Software-Defined Adversarial Trajec-
tory Sampling (SoftATS), an OpenFlow-based mechanism to
efficiently monitor packet trajectories, also in the presence
of non-cooperating or even adversarial switches or routers,
e.g., containing hardware backdoors. Our approach is based
on a secure, redundant and adaptive sample distribution
scheme which allows us to provably detect adversarial
switches or routers trying to reroute, mirror, drop, inject, or
modify packets (i.e., header and/or payload). We evaluate
the effectiveness of our approach in different adversarial
settings, report on a proof-of-concept implementation, and
provide a first evaluation of the performance overheads of
such a scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern computer networks constitute a crucial infras-
tructure: enterprise and datacenter networks as well as
the Internet in general need to provide high availability
and robustness. These increasingly stringent depend-
ability requirements stand in stark contrast to today’s
vulnerable routing system. In particular, while the prob-
lem of how to provide authenticity and correctness of
topology propagation and route computation has been
investigated intensively in the literature [1], [2], [3], [4],
little is known about the vulnerabilities introduced by
an unreliable or even malicious/adversarial infrastruc-
ture [5], [6], [7], [8], [9]. Indeed, it seems challenging to
perform routing over an unreliable infrastructure.
This is problematic: attackers have repeatedly demon-
strated their ability to compromise switches and
routers [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], thousands of com-
promised access and core routers are being traded un-
derground [15], networking vendors have left back-
doors open [16], [17], national security agencies can
bug network equipment and introduce hardware back-
doors [18], hacker tools scan and eventually exploit
routers with weak passwords, default settings are openly
available on the Web, etc. The attack surface on net-
work infrastructure is further exacerbated by vulnerable
implementations of network protocols (e.g. CVE-2014-
9295, CVE-2014-0160, CVE-2015-6325), especially in the
context of more virtualized networks [19], as well as
by today’s trend toward open networks, rendering it
relatively easy for users to add switches and routers,
establish links, and advertise routes. This concerns both
wireless and wireline networks (e.g., powerline, overlay,
or phone networks [20]).
The problem is a fundamental one: even large enter-
prises or national security agencies often cannot afford
and do not have the expertise to develop their own
trusted, high-performance network hardware. Rather,
they need to rely on equipment that can be compromised
during the supply chain [18], [21].
An unreliable routing system introduces several
threats: for instance, wrongfully forwarded packets,
i.e., packets following incorrect routes or “trajectories”,
may bypass security-critical components such as fire-
walls or intrusion detection/prevention systems (e.g., in
MPLS [22]), and may be able to enter or leave security
critical zones. Forwarding or mirroring packets wrong-
fully can also be used to violate isolation requirements
in multi-tenant datacenters (e.g., forwarding patient data
between two health-care providers using the same phys-
ical network [23], which is illegal [24]), to infiltrate
VPNs [15] or to exfiltrate sensitive information (see e.g.,
Operation Aurora [25]).
While encryption may be used to mitigate some
of these problems, cryptographic approaches require
an additional infrastructure, and also come with over-
heads at runtime. This is undesirable especially in high-
performance networks. Moreover, even encrypted traffic
may leak sensitive information, e.g., about the times and
frequency of communications.
Indeed, today, we lack good tools to verify routes in
adversarial environments. For example, while traceroute
and trajectory sampling tools are useful to verify routes
in “reliable networks” [26], [27], and may still perform
well in the context of faulty and heterogeneous net-
works [28], [29], they are insufficient in non-cooperative
environments: a compromised switch or router may
not reply with the correct information, and can also
not conform to a scheme based on packet labeling or
tagging [30], [31].
A. Trajectory Sampling
Trajectory Sampling (TS) is a low-overhead, direct and
passive measurement method to infer packet routes. In
a nutshell, in trajectory sampling, packets are sampled
ar
X
iv
:1
70
5.
00
37
0v
1 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 30
 A
pr
 20
17
according to a random distribution at different routers
(usually defined by a hash over the immutable packet
header space, e.g., the IP addresses and TCP ports), and
sent to a collector, reconstructing the trajectories based on
the collected samples. In general, in trajectory sampling,
subsets of packets are sampled consistently: each packet
is sampled either at all routers it encounters, or at none. TS
features a number of interesting properties:
1) It provides a direct observation of the packets
traversing the network. This is in contrast to in-
direct methods [32] that involve uncertainties with
respect to the network’s logical and physical state.
2) It is a passive measurement technique: it does
not require, for example probe packets (which can
introduce additional load and may be subject to a
different forwarding behavior), nor does it require
the modification of packets (e.g., tagging requires
additional header space and rules at the routers). It
is hence a particularly attractive approach to moni-
tor the routes taken by packets for high-performance
networks at a potentially low cost to forwarding.
3) It is a flexible technique that can be tuned for the
networking environment. For example, the sam-
pling rate can be adjusted on demand and the load
on the collector can be adjusted accordingly. Fur-
thermore, the distribution used for sample selection
can be changed.
However, a major shortcoming is that classic TS relies
on the assumption that all routers are trusted. There
is no mechanism preventing adversarial routers from
misreporting sampling information. As the sampling
distribution is known to all the routers (a packet is
either collected at all routers it encounters, or at none),
an adversarial router could simply exploit knowledge
about gaps in the sampling space to conceal misbehavior.
For example, an adversarial router can drop all packets
not being sampled and is guaranteed to go undetected
unless the sampling distribution is changed. Hence what
we need is a solution which tolerates adversarial routers,
prevents exploiting holes in the sampling space, and
detects forwarding based attacks such as packet drops
and injections.
To prevent routers from exploiting holes in the sam-
pling space, Lee et al. [15] propose routers to sample
different packets with pairs of routers sampling the same
packet. They call their scheme ”secure split assignment”
trajectory sampling. Although novel, and dare we say
ahead of their time, the authors only present a first
simulation of detecting packet drop related attacks. As
we will shortly see, our scheme Adversarial Trajectory
Sampling (ATS) develops their idea further.
B. Contributions
This paper makes the following contributions:
• We identify and model a wide range of routing
attacks that can be launched by untrusted data plane
components such as drop, injection, denial-of-service,
man-in-the-middle, rerouting, reconnaissance, mirroring
and modification attacks.
• We observe that Software-Defined Networks (SDNs)
provide an ideal framework to perform secure tra-
jectory sampling in adversarial environments.
• We present parallelizable algorithms that leverage
secure and redundant dynamic sampling schemes to
detect routing attacks from a logically centralized
controller.
• We formally prove the effectiveness of our detection
algorithm by deriving the detection probabilities for
different attacks.
• We present and evaluate an OpenFlow based pro-
totype.
C. Paper Scope
In general, the goal of our approach is to empower the
network operator to detect misbehavior, as opposed to
prevent misbehavior. In other words, alone, our approach
is unable to ensure a packet will not traverse certain
network regions or reach certain destinations. However,
we believe that the possibility to detect misbehavior is a
strong incentive for routers and vendors to not deviate
from the correct behavior. Moreover, we in this paper
do not consider the orthogonal question of how a user
should specify its desired and undesired routes to the
network operator.
D. Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II introduces our threat model. Section III and
Section IV present the challenges and our proposed
solution in detail. Section V analyzes the detection
probabilities achieved by our approach. Section VI re-
ports on our prototype implementation, and Section VII
presents experimental results on the detection time and
performance overheads under real traffic workloads.
Section VIII discusses additional aspects and extensions
of SoftATS. After reviewing related literature in Sec-
tion IX, we conclude our work in Section X.
II. THREAT MODEL
We consider a network consisting of a set of switches
(or for the purpose of this paper equivalently: routers),
connected by a set of links. We consider an adversarial
model where switches are untrusted, e.g., they may con-
tain (hardware and/or software) backdoors that may be
introduced by compromising the vendor’s supply chain.
Accordingly, we do not place any restrictions on what an
adversarial switch can and cannot do. For example, an
adversarial switch can fabricate and transmit any type of
message, both in the data plane (e.g., duplicate packets)
as well as in the control plane (e.g., report wrong sam-
ples); it can also arbitrarily deviate from the OpenFlow
specification, all at the risk of being detected. However,
we assume that the network edge (e.g., the servers in the
datacenter) are trusted. This assumption is necessary for
the following reason: If a packet only traverses the edge,
then it is impossible to detect whether the edge switch
forwarded the packet correctly or not using our scheme.
More systematically, an adversarial switch may per-
form the following attacks (cf. Figure 1).
1) Denial-of-service: It can drop transit packets.
2) Rerouting: It can forward a packet to the wrong
port (e.g., breaking logical isolations).
3) Mirroring: It can duplicate a packet, and e.g., send
one to the correct and one to an incorrect port.
4) Man-in-the-middle: It can also delete packets, gen-
erate new packets, or modify the header or payload
of packets (e.g., changing the VLAN to break iso-
lation domains).
In fact, we observe that all attacks considered in this
paper can be represented by the following two primi-
tives:
1) Drop: An adversary chooses a specific source-
destination pair, and drops some (or all) packets
communicated between this pair.
2) Injection: An adversary injects new packets (or
packets sent earlier to other destinations) to the
network.
TABLE I
A COMPREHENSIVE OVERVIEW OF ATTACKS, THEIR RESPECTIVE
PRIMITIVES, AND A SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE ATTACK.
Attack Attack
primitive
Attack description
Denial-of-
service
Drop Switch simply drops the
packet(s).
Reconnaissance Injection Switch simply injects a
new packet.
Man-in-the-
middle
Drop+Injection Switch modifies the orig-
inal packet and forwards
it along the original path.
Man-in-the-
middle proxy
Drop+Injection Switch drops the origi-
nal packet and forwards
a modified version along
a new path.
Mirror Injection Switch forwards the orig-
inal packet and sends a
modified version along a
new path.
For instance, packet re-routing attacks, where an ad-
versary reroutes a packet from some source to an ille-
gitimate destination, can be modelled as a combination
of two independent attacks where in the first attack
the packet is dropped and in the second the packet is
injected. Mirroring can be described as an injection of
copied packets at some switch. A modification can be
modelled as dropping and subsequently injecting modi-
fied packets (e.g., different header or payload). Packet
delays can be abstracted as a drop and an injection
attack.
Note that drops and injection are not only primitives
resp. building blocks of more complex attacks, but can
also be used as standalone attacks: frequent drops result
in a denial-of-service, and injection could be used to con-
tact Command-and-Control (C&C) servers of a botnet.
Table I presents the attacks, attack primitives, and the
attacks description.
There may be more than one adversarial switch, and
adversarial switches may even collude: e.g., for covert
switch-to-switch communication, one switch can inject
a packet and the other drop it; or, one switch does
not report the to-be-sampled packets of the colluding
switch, or reports a non-existent packet. However, ob-
viously and as we will see, the detection probability of
our approach decreases with an increasing number of
adversaries. Accordingly, we in the following, assume
that the number of malicious and colluding switches is
small. We argue that the assumption that only a subset
of switches are malicious and collude, is reasonable in
practice: for example, switches from different vendors
or switches manufactured in different countries, are un-
likely to collude. Indeed, leveraging heterogeneity is a
key principle to improve security of networks [34], [35].
The solution proposed in this paper relies on a soft-
ware controller (namely the OpenFlow controller) which
securely distributes sampling rules and collects sam-
ples. Accordingly, we assume that this controller and
its applications are trusted entities: for example, they
are developed in-house and audited using static and
dynamic program analyses—an affordable measure for
large enterprises or security agencies. Moreover, we
show that our algorithms are parallelizable, enabling a
highly available implementation of these components.
III. THE CASE FOR AN SDN APPROACH
We first identify the fundamental challenges and re-
quirements of Adversarial Trajectory Sampling (ATS), and
then describe how opportunities in SDN meet the stated
requirements.
A. Requirements and Challenges
In general, we can decompose the challenges involved
in designing a strong adversarial trajectory sampling
scheme into several sub-challenges:
Computing and Assigning Redundant Sample Ranges.
The sampling strategy of SoftATS is based on the split
assignment approach by Lee et al. [15], which requires
the computation and secure distribution of “good sample
ranges”. These ranges should be allocated
• . . . independently at random: given its own sampling
ranges, a switch cannot guess with high probability
the location or the sampling range of other switches.
• . . . sampling space: not all switches should sample
the same packet. Instead, different switches should
sample different packets.
Internet
Fig. 1. Overview of possible malicious switch attacks. As an example, a Clos (“fat-tree”) topology is depicted (for ease of representation, we
aggregate links in this figure, see [33] for a full representation): servers are organized into racks, and are interconnected via so-called Top-of-Rack
(ToR) switches. Racks are connected by aggregation switches to form pods. Finally, pods are connected by core switches, which may also connect
the datacenter to the Internet. Top left: Denial-of-service attack resp. packet drop: instead of forwarding the packet to the server in the second
rack (dashed path), the malicious switch drops the packet. Top right: The malicious switch injects a copy of the packet to the rack (dashed path), in
addition to sending it along the regular path (solid path). In the rack where the packet is mirrored to, a malicious server may exfiltrate confidential
information. Bottom left: A malicious switch modifies the packet along the route (man-in-the-middle attack). Bottom right: A malicious core switch
injects a harmful packet to attack an internal server (an insider attack).
• . . . redundantly: although different switches should
sample different packets, there must be an overlap
so that misbehaving switches can be detected by
other switches.
There are different approaches to achieve such a sam-
pling distribution. For example, for each hash range, a
fixed number (e.g., two) of switches may be selected
uniformly at random in the network. Alternatively, sam-
ples may be assigned in a more flexible manner, without
imposing strict constraints on the number of replicas.
Securely Distributing Samples. A mechanism is needed
to securely distribute samples to the switches. The sam-
ples must be encrypted to preserve confidentiality, and
authenticated to preserve data integrity. However, this
may be challenging when the bi-directional channel
between the sample generator and switch are not con-
nected via a dedicated network (commonly called the
out-of-band network or management network). Mali-
cious switches can drop packets to the controller that
contain the samples.
Parallel Analysis. Interpolating trajectories as well as
detecting anomalies requires computational resources
on the collector. In order to sustain high performance
workloads, the detection logic should be parallelized and
distributed.
Avoiding Biases. The sampling should affect all pack-
ets with equal probability. Moreover, only an unbiased
sampling can guarantee a maximal detection probability:
if certain packets (e.g., packets with certain source or
destination addresses) are sampled more frequently than
others, this may be exploited by an attacker.
Dynamic Reassignments. Trajectory sampling, with or
without split assignments, only covers a subset of pack-
ets. In order to maximize the detection probability and
prevent adversaries from learning monitoring patterns,
and while keeping the solution scalable, sampling distri-
butions should be changed over time. However, this is
non-trivial, as changing the assignments on the switch
while traffic is sampled yields synchronization con-
straints [36], [37].
B. Making The Case for SDN
We find that Software-Defined Networks (SDNs) in
general and OpenFlow in particular provide an ideal
environment to implement an adversarial trajectory sam-
pling for the following reasons:
1) Programmable, logically centralized control: The Open-
Flow controller provides an ideal platform to im-
plement the logic of the sampling and the collector:
simple controller applications can be used to com-
Sampling Logic Sample Distribution Sample Collection Sample Analysis
SoftATS
Fig. 2. Overview of SoftATS: Switches are connected to a logically
centralized controller, which collects samples (here: from the two black
switches) in order to observe trajectories. In this case, the samples pro-
vided by the black switches reveal that a malicious switch must have
mirrored the packet (intended route indicated as solid line, mirrored
extra path indicated as dashed line).
pute smart sample range distribution schemes, and
to distribute, collect and analyze trajectories.
2) Secure communication channels: An encrypted and
authenticated channel between switches (i.e.,
OpenFlow switches) and controller is readily sup-
ported in OpenFlow. These connections are based
on TLS/SSL, include sequence numbers and could
also be established in-band.
3) Support for sampling: An OpenFlow switch readily
supports the necessary functionality for sampling.
That is, a sampling range can easily be added,
changed, and removed at the switch, in the form
of flow rules. Moreover, OpenFlow switches such as
Open vSwitch readily support computing (simple)
hash functions [38].
4) Support for taking into account payload: Unlike legacy
switches, OpenFlow switches can operate not only
on Layer-2, but also Layer-3 and Layer-4 header
fields. Accordingly, sampling can be performed on
a per-packet granularity rather than a per-flow
granularity. For example, sample decisions may be
based on the TCP checksum field which depends
on the packet payload. Moreover, some OpenFlow
switches (such as NoviKitTM) also support sam-
pling based on packet payloads (e.g., defined by a
certain offset). As we will see, by collecting entire
packets and not just headers (as readily supported
by the Packet-in mechanism), more sophisticated
attacks can be prevented.
IV. THE SOFTATS SYSTEM
In this section, we describe our Adversarial Trajectory
Sampling (ATS) scheme system which provably detects
a wide range of routing attacks in SDNs. In particular,
we present the SoftATS architecture and our algorithms
in detail.
SoftATS is designed for an OpenFlow-based network
and a logically centralized (but possibly physically dis-
tributed) controller. The SoftATS controller serves as the
(secure) distributor of sampling ranges, as the (secure)
collector of the sampled packets, as well as the analyzer
accordingly. As we will discuss later in more detail, some
of this logic can easily be parallelized. SoftATS relies on
the following concepts:
• Packet Hashing Function h: A hash function h :
{0, 1}∗ → H which maps (parts of) the packet
to some hash domain H. We consider two types of
hashing approaches:
1) Header based: The hash is computed only over
the immutable header fields of the packet.
2) Payload dependent: The hash also depends on
the payload of the packet.
• Hash Assignments A(s): Each switch s, is assigned
a set of hash values A(s). The switch is configured to
report (sample) any packet with content that hashes
to A(s). The size of A(s) divided by the size of the
hash domain defines the sampling ratio of switch s,
denoted by ps. In other words:
ps =
|A(s)|
|H|
• Assignment Granularity δ: The set A(s) can be
configured in the switch using a set of configuration
rules R(s), each corresponding to a disjoint subset
of δ hash values, e.g., through the use of a range or
a ternary bit pattern. The following equality holds:
|R(s)| · δ = |A(s)|
Clearly the granularity affects the configuration
space complexity.
• Redundancy: In order to verify the trajectory of a
sampled packet in the network, it must be sampled
at more than one switch (but for secrecy purposes,
not all).
SoftATS is a modular framework which supports
many different sample assignment strategies, leverag-
ing SDN’s flexible configuration and packet matching
capabilities. Next we discuss four important elements
of the adversarial sampling process in turn: (i) how
hash assignments are applied in the switches, (ii) how
hash assignments can be changed over time, (iii) how
sampled packets are collected, and (iv) how to recon-
struct the trajectories given the samples, using a highly
parallelizable algorithm.
Configuring Hash Assignments for Sampling. SoftATS
offers many flexibilities in terms of assignment. For
example regarding the hash assignment for each switch
in the network, there are different approaches, e.g.:
1) pairwise: For each pair of switches, si, sj ∈ S, we
assign a randomly selected subset of hash val-
ues A(si, sj). In total, each switch si is assigned with
the union of all subsets selected for all its pairs,
i.e., A(si) = ∪j 6=i A(si, sj).
2) independent: Each switch is assigned with a ran-
domly selected subset of hash values, indepen-
dently from other switches.
In the pairwise approach, we also ensure multiple
matches (with probability 1), avoiding ineffective assign-
ments (e.g., with local unmonitored ranges) that might
be chosen in the independent assignment.
The hash function can be applied to just the packet
header or the payload as well. In general, SoftATS
maintains an OpenFlow session to each switch and uses
it to send Flow-mod or Group-mod commands according
to the switch specific hash assignment.
Packet Header Hashing. In case the hash function
should be applied to the packet header, we configure the
default hash based selection group with |H|/δ buckets.
Among these buckets, |R(s)| = |A(s)|/δ buckets are
defined to send the packet to the collector. The indices
of the sampling buckets are chosen according to the
assigned hash values. Note that by using weighted buck-
ets, the total number of buckets can be linear in |R(s)|,
e.g., replacing k consecutive dummy buckets with one
dummy bucket of weight k. An example of such a
configuration is shown in Listing 1
Packet Payload Hashing. In case the hash function
should be applied to the packet payload, then the switch
is configured to match the TCP/UDP checksum field.
Matching the checksum field using OpenFlow, requires
the experimenter extension and has already been proto-
typed by Afek et al. [39]. We emphasize that TCP/UDP
checksums are only used at the switch for sampling,
while deeper payload verification (hashing) can be per-
formed at the collector. Matching the TCP/UDP check-
sum field alleviates the overhead of checksum com-
putation on the switch. The flexibility of OpenFlow
allows custom match fields, therefore for packets that
do not include checksum fields, a custom match field
and hash algorithm may be used. Concretely, assuming
that the rules (subsets) R(s) can be expressed by ternary
patterns, s is configured with exactly |R(s)| flow entries,
each sending the matched packet to the collector.
In both cases, sending the sampled packets to the col-
lector is performed by the OpenFlow action to forward
to the controller as a Packet-in. An example of such a
configuration is shown in Listing 2
Dynamic Configuration. It is useful to change the hash
assignment on the switches as at any moment in time,
SoftATS samples only a fraction (ps) of the traffic. This
way, over time, it becomes difficult for the adversary to
avoid being detected as no information about a static
sampling pattern is leaked.
However, changing the hash assignment over time is
non-trivial. During the addition or removal of a hash as-
signment from a switch configuration, there is an uncer-
tainty regarding the exact time at which an update takes
Alg. 1 Initial Pairwise Assignment of Hash Values
Require: sampling rate p, pattern size δ, total hashes H,
switches S
1: x ← p · |H|/δ · (|S| − 1) . number of hash patterns
per pair of switches
2: assignedHashes← 0 . initialize the assigned hash
counter
3: totalHashes← x · |S| · (|S| − 1) . number of hash
patterns for all switches
4: while assignedHashes < totalHashes do
5: randomly choose a switch-pair (si, sj)i 6=j ∈ S
6: randomly choose a hash pattern h ∈ H
7: if |A(si, sj)| < x&&|A(sj, si)| < x then
8: A(si, sj).add(h)
9: A(sj, si).add(h)
10: assignedHashes← assignedHashes + 2
return hash assignments A
Alg. 2 Random Permutation of Hash Assignment Values
Require: switches S, total hashes H, hash assignments A
1: while True do
2: randomly choose a switch pair (si, sj)i 6=j ∈ S
3: randomly choose a hash index k ∈ {1..x}
4: randomly choose a hash h ∈ H
5: A(si, sj)[k]← h
6: wait a random period
effect: the communication network between the con-
troller and the switch is inherently asynchronous, and
also data structure reconfiguration times at the switches
may differ [40]. To avoid false positives, SoftATS needs to
temporarily suppress alerts related to the updated switch
and hash values. In particular, hash values should be
changed at random times, and involving only one (pair
of) switch(es) at a time: thus, a malicious switch cannot
abuse the time period of uncertainty. A simple update
scheme is described in Algorithm 2.
Collecting the Samples. Reporting the samples from
all switches to the collector is performed using Packet-
ins within the encrypted and authenticated OpenFlow
session, protecting them even if communication is in-
band; this addresses known sample integrity issues [15].
Nevertheless, whenever possible, we suggest using out-
of-band control in order to prevent sophisticated attacks,
e.g., using burst analysis of the inband control channel.
In case of distributed control planes, the Packet-ins (the
samples) can be sent to the same controller which config-
ured the sampling rules, or to another controller server
depending on operator requirements.
Analyzing the Samples. At the heart of trajectory sam-
pling lies the construction or “interpolation” of trajecto-
ries out of samples. In an SDN, the controller has a global
view of the network, i.e., it knows the location of hosts in
Listing 1
AN EXAMPLE OPENFLOW GROUP AND FLOW TABLE USED TO SAMPLE PACKETS USING THE HEADER HASHING. A VLAN TAG IS PUSHED INTO THE
PACKET TO DETERMINE THE BUCKET THE PACKET WAS HASHED TO.
group id =1 , type= s e l e c t , bucket= a c t i o n s =push vlan : 0 x8100 , s e t f i e l d :1234−>vlan vid ,CONTROLLER: 6 5 5 3 5 ,
bucket= a c t i o n s =push vlan : 0 x8100 , s e t f i e l d :1235−>vlan vid ,CONTROLLER:65535
cookie =0x1 , t a b l e =0 , p r i o r i t y =1 , in por t =2 , nw dst = 1 . 1 . 1 . 0 / 2 4 a c t i o n s =output : 3 , group : 1
Listing 2
AN EXAMPLE OPENFLOW FLOW TABLE USED TO SAMPLE PACKETS USING THE TCP CHECKSUM FIELD.
cookie =0x1 , t a b l e =0 , p r i o r i t y =2 , tcp , chksum=1234 a c t i o n s =CONTROLLER: 6 5 5 3 5 , go to tab le : 1
cookie =0x2 , t a b l e =0 , p r i o r i t y =1 , ip a c t i o n s =got o tab le : 1
cookie =0x3 , t a b l e =1 , p r i o r i t y =1 , in por t =2 , nw dst = 1 . 1 . 1 . 0 / 2 4 a c t i o n s =output : 3
the network, the switches, links between switches, and
links between switches and hosts. For example, with two
samples from two different switches, the controller can
compute and compare the packet’s trajectory using the
topological information it has. This makes it ideal for
trajectory computation. Based on the collected samples,
anomalies such as missing or extra samples are iden-
tified, and drop or inject attacks detected accordingly.
SoftATS performs this analysis in the collector following
Algorithm 3, as explained next.
The sampled packets arriving at the collector, a hash
of the packet, their sampling locations, and arrival times,
are stored in a list ordered by time. We will refer to this
list as the history. Packets are processed after spending
max delay seconds in the history, where max delay is a
time interval (Round Trip Time) defined to ensure that
all other samples of the packet have arrived.
At the collector, the processing of a packet includes,
first, constructing the trajectory of the packets, using a
policy oracle. The policy oracle returns the path (trajec-
tory) that suits the packet. Then, considering the switch
hash assignments along the path, all other expected
samples of the packet in the history are searched for.
To detect packet modifications, hashes of the samples
are compared to ensure no modifications. If a sample is
missing for some switch s, we distinguish between the
following two cases depending on the location of s along
the path and relative to other sampling switches along
the path:
1) Path suffix only: If the packet was sampled by s but
not by switches after s, we report a drop attack.
2) Path prefix only: If the packet was sampled by s
but not by switches before s, we report an injection
attack.
While the mechanism to identify injection and drop-
ping events are similar, the severity of, and reaction
to these two events may differ. In particular, while
injections may occur rather rarely “by accident”, be-
nign packet drops do. Accordingly, for drops arising
individually and without statistical patterns, no alarm
should be raised. To deal with the ephemeral hash value
Alg. 3 Detection
Require: hash assignments A, switches S, incoming
event (packet-In) queue Q, network policy ora-
cle Policy
1: History← () . empty sorted list
2: t0 = time() . current time
3: while true do
4: timestamp, pkt, s← Q.get() . blocking get
5: History.add(timestamp, pkt, s)
6: if timestamp− t0 < RTT then
7: continue
8: while History.min() < timestamp− RTT do
9: timestamp‘, pkt‘, s‘← History.get min()
10: h‘← hash(pkt‘)
11: path← Policy.get path su f f ix(pkt‘, s‘)
12: for s“ ∈ path do
13: if h‘ ∈ A(s“)&& (pkt‘, s“) /∈ History then
14: Report Drop of pkt‘ between (s‘, s“)
15: Break
16: h← hash(pkt)
17: path← Policy.get path pre f ix(pkt, s)
18: for s“ ∈ path do
19: if h ∈ A(s“)&& (pkt, s“) /∈ History then
20: Report Injection of pkt between (s‘, s“)
21: Break
assignments and avoid false positives, we introduce a
grace period around dynamic updates.
Parallel Trajectory Construction. While the sampling
approach implemented by SoftATS is efficient and effec-
tive, in order to scale the system further, we can easily
parallelize SoftATS by executing the detection algorithm
in multiple threads or by using multiple collectors that
execute the detection algorithm. To increase the through-
put of Algorithm 3 using multiple threads, the sam-
ples received by the collector can be evenly distributed
across the threads. To increase the throughput using
multiple collectors, the samples from the switches can be
sent to different collectors. Such partitionings are highly
scalable: sample dependencies are restricted to a single
packet.
V. ANALYSIS OF DETECTION PROBABILITY
This section presents a formal analysis of the detec-
tion probability for a single attacker in SoftATS under
different attacks, and in different scenarios. We begin by
describing our approach for analyzing the probability
to detect various attacks based on a pairwise static
assignment distribution. Following that, we describe the
detection probabilities for a single packet attack, and
flow-based attacks. Given that the assignment distri-
bution is static, in the next section, we will report on
prototype experiments which evaluate and extend our
insights to time-varying assignment distributions.
A. General Approach and Notation
Observe that if either the original or (one of the) actual
route(s) taken by a packet traverses at least two sampling
points, SoftATS guarantees detection. This is obvious for
simple routing attacks, i.e., packets which are rerouted,
injected, dropped, or mirrored. However, this also holds
for sophisticated attacks which involve changing packet
contents. For example, consider a scenario where sam-
pling is based on TCP checksums and assume that an
attacker modifies the packet in such a way that TCP
checksum remains unchanged. Even in this case, SoftATS
ensures detection: with the unmodified checksum, the
packet is sampled and sent entirely to the controller,
which can (bit-by-bit) compare the packets, and detect
modifications.
In addition to the attacked packets, whether the at-
tacker reports the samples, or not, for the attacked
packets affects the detection probability. It is better for
a single attacker to report samples for packets that are
dropped, and not report samples for packets that are
injected. In the analysis that follows, we assume that the
attacker follows this strategy with resepect to reporting
samples for attacked packets.
We now focus on the pairwise assignment scheme and
assume a payload packet hashing function. We consider
three types of attacks: (1) single packet attacks (drop and
inject), (2) dropping an entire flow, and (3) injecting a
new flow. We will use the following notations:
• n: the total number of switches
• p: the same sampling ratio of the switch
• PS(x, y): the number of hash range pairs involv-
ing switches from two sets of sizes x and y,
i.e., PS(x, y) = x · y
• P˜S(x): the number of pairs involving at least one
switch from a set of x switches, i.e., P˜S(x) = x ·
(n− x) + (x2).
• PS−(x, y): the number of pairs involving switches
of a set of size x but no switches from a second set
of size y, i.e., PS−(x, y) = P˜S(x)− PS(x, y)
• (B, A): the number of switches along a path be-
fore (B) and after (A) the attacking switch respec-
tively, i.e., the attack location
B. Single Packet Attack
In the single packet drop attack, the attacker drops a
single packet from a flow. Similarly, in the single packet
injection attack, the attacker injects a single new packet
into a flow. As we will see, the probability of detecting
a single packet drop attack and a single packet inject
attack, is the same.
To compute the detection probability, we assume that
the attacked packet belongs to a flow along a single path.
The location of the attack along the path is expressed
by (B, A) which stands for the number of switches along
the path before and after the attacking switch respec-
tively. Moreover we assume that all switches have the
same sampling ratio, p. Therefore, each pair of switches
that share an assignment contains p/(n− 1) of the hash
space |H| (independently at random from the other
pairs).
Recall that a detection occurs if the packet is sampled
by at least one switch before and at least one switch
after the attack location. By definition, there are exactly
PS(A, B) pairs surrounding the attack location (B, A):
we will refer to these pairs as explicit pairs.
However, we observe that the actual detection proba-
bility is slightly higher than what we would obtain by
focusing on the explicit pairs alone. Due to a birthday
paradox, it is probable that other pairs surround the
attack location, as they happen to have the same assign-
ment before and after the attack location. We will refer
to these pairs as implicit pairs.
Fig. 3 visualizes the difference between explicit and
implicit pairs: implicit pairs arise if B2 and X, and A1
and Y are assigned the same hash value.
To evaluate the number of implicit pairs, we need
to compute the collision probability between two sets
of random variables [41], where the (maximal) set sizes
are given by PS−(B, A) and PS−(A, B), and the random
variables can assume any of |H| discrete values (or |H|/δ
considering assignment granularity). Following work
by Yancey [42], we use COL(x, y) := x · y/|H| as an
approximation for the collision of two sets of random
assignments of sizes x and y.
The detection probability, Ppa, then equals the prob-
ability that the packet is sampled by one of the pairs
surrounding the attack location. Considering the number
of explicit and implicit pairs, we obtain that
Ppa = 1−
(
1− p
n− 1
)PS(A,B)+COL(PS−(B,A),PS−(A,B))
(1)
We note that if the attacker does not report a sample
for a dropped packet, then the probability of detection
is slightly higher, as the assignments shared between the
Fig. 3. Illustration of explicit and implicit pairs. An example network
topology is shown below a table indicating the hash assignments for
each node in the network. The table’s rows and columns indicate the
nodes. The assignment for a pair of nodes is given by the cell that
intersects the chosen nodes. M is the attacker and its position is given
by (2,2). B1 and B2, and A1 and A2, form two explicit pairs, indicated
by the dotted orange lines and the orange cell in the topology and table
resp. B1 and B2 share the hash value 100, and A1 and A2 share the hash
value 600. B2 and X, and A1 and Y, also form explicit pairs. However,
the two pairs are assigned the same hash value of 400, making them
an implicit pair. The implicit pair is indicated by the dashed green
line and green cell in the topology and table resp. To keep the figure
simple, not all explicit pairs are shown.
attacker, and switches before and after it aid in detection.
Similarly, if the attacker reports a sample for an injected
packet, the chance of detection is equal to that of the
drop and the attacker not reporting the sample.
C. Flow Drop Attack
Assume now a scenario where an attacker drops the
entire flow. Obviously, also here, the detection probabil-
ity depends on the location of the attacker (B, A) along
the flow’s path. Also of importance is the packet hash
function used to detect this attack. In particular, hashing
only the header results in the same values for all packets
in the flow, and a constant detection probability Ppa (as
for a single packet described for the single packet attack),
regardless of the number of dropped packets. In contrast,
hashing the packet’s payload leads to more random
(per packet) values, thereby making the detection of
each packet an (ideally) independent experiment, each
with success probability Ppa. Therefore, the detection
probability of the entire attack describes a geometric dis-
tribution, and the expected number of dropped packets
till detection is 1/Ppa.
D. Flow Injection Attack
We next examine attacks injecting new flows. It is easy
to see that if the injected flow’s packets have uniformly
distributed hash values (as assumed for the original
flow), then the detection probability is like that of the
drop attack. The expected number of injected packets
till detection is 1/Ppa in this case.
However, if we consider a more sophisticated attack
wherein the attacker may craft all of its packets to hash
to the same value from the packet hash function, then the
attack can either be detected with the first packet from
the injected flow, or never. The initial (and static) hash
assignment of the switches is a crucial factor to detect
such an attack.
By dynamically configuring the switch pairs hash
assignments with new random values and at random
times (following a memoryless Poisson distribution),
the detection probability may be improved. The update
rate should be high enough to introduce many new
assignments, at the same time it should keep the number
of values updated low: alerts resulting from the recently
updated assignments are temporarily suppressed (to
avoid false positives).
The detection of the sophisticated flow inject attack
will occur when the Poisson process of updates results
in an assignment surrounding the attack position which
includes the hash value used in the injected flow. We can
distinguish between three cases, depending on whether
the crafted value is assigned before the attack point, after
the attack point, or not at all. The derivation of a closed-
form expression for the expected detection time is diffi-
cult, as there are multiple parameters to consider, such
as the duration of the attack, the update rate, the update
size and the rate of traffic flowing through the path. The
duration of the attack is the most important parameter:
at one end of the spectrum lies the static case, at the
other end of the spectrum, if the assignments change
frequently between injections, the attack is equivalent to
using different hash values and therefore similar to the
flow drop attack.
E. Collusion
Our analysis generalizes to collusion, as follows. We
assume that multiple switches collude, e.g., communi-
cate with each other (to coordinate a later attack), and
do not report each others’ samples. To analyze such
behavior, we can adapt our above analysis. We simply
compute the detection probability considering a single
attacker at a time, ignoring the other attackers along the
path, effectively reducing the path length for an attacker
under analysis.
VI. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION
To demonstrate the feasibility of our approach, to
validate and extend the results of our formal analysis,
and to investigate the potential performance overheads,
we implemented a prototype of SoftATS.
We use ONOS-1.4 (implemented in Java) as our con-
troller (collector) and implemented SoftATS as an appli-
cation on top of it. We used the OpenFlow 1.3 specifica-
tion implemented by ONOS for our prototype. ONOS
offers the many functionalities and services required
to implement SoftATS, such as multi-threading, path
service, flow rule service, device service, group service,
and packet service.
Fig. 4 illustrates the architecture of our implementa-
tion. It is made up of five main components: Configu-
ration, Hash Assignment, Sample Dispatcher, Detectors
and a Trajectory Oracle. In the following we will elab-
orate on each of the components. After that, we will
briefly describe the data plane components of SoftATS.
A. Configuration
The different parameters of SoftATS such as the sam-
pling ratio, detector threads, pairwise assignment or
independent assignment, etc. can be configured via the
ONOS Command Line Interface (CLI).
B. Hash Assignment
The hash assigner executes the pairwise assignment of
hash values (Algorithm 1) and utilizes the flow objective
service to assign sampling flow rules to the switches
when payload hashing is used. For packet header hash-
ing, the group service is used to assign flow and group
table rules. The hash assignments are then stored in a
data structure that keeps track of the hash assignments
for all the switches. The hash assignments are later used
by the detector thread(s) to carry out the detection algo-
rithm (Algorithm 3). For dynamic assignments, the hash
permutator executes the permutation of hash assignment
values (Algorithm 2) in its own thread following a
Poisson distribution [43]. Its average update rate can
also be configured via the ONOS CLI. It passes the new
assignment to the hash assigner to have the assignment
pushed to the switch(es) and have the hash assignment
data structure updated.
C. Sample Dispatcher
The packet service in ONOS receives samples from
the switches as Packet-Ins. It strips away the OpenFlow
header and passes the Ethernet frame (packet) to the
sample dispatcher’s packet processor (FIFO) queue of
SoftATS. The sample dispatcher always takes the first
sample from the queue and dispatches the sample to
the appropriate detector’s history queue. The logic for
the dispatcher and the detector threads are based on
how one wants to distribute the sampling load. In our
case, we divide the hash space |H| evenly across the
detector threads. The dispatcher simply checks which
detector thread is responsible for the particular sample
(according to its hash) and places the sample into the
detector’s history queue.
D. Detectors
Each detector thread executes the detection algorithm
(Algorithm 3) and therefore has its own history queue
which allows it to operate independent of the other
threads. There are no dependencies on the other threads.
The only concurrency requirement on the history queue
is that operation on it be synchronized.
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Fig. 4. A high-level overview of the SoftATS software architecture. The
Hash Assigner, executes Algorithm 1, stores them in Hash Assignment,
and uses the Flow Objective Service or Group Service to install
sampling rules on the switches. A received sample is processed by
the Sample Dispatcher and sent to the appropriate Detector thread.
The Detector uses the Hash Assignment, and path information obtained
from the Trajectory Oracle (which has a global network view) to detect
whether an attack has occurred or not, and report accordingly.
E. Trajectory Oracle
The network policy oracle implemented as the trajec-
tory oracle in our prototype, returns the path suffix and
path prefix to the detector by obtaining host, device and
path information from ONOS services. If an attack is
detected by the detector, an alert is generated in the log
messages of ONOS.
F. Data Plane
For the data plane, we use Open vSwitch (OvS) as it
readily implements OpenFlow 1.3 and supports packet
header hashing via group tables. By default, OvS, ONOS
and OpenFlow do not support matching the checksum
field of TCP/UDP packets in a flow rule [44]. Therefore,
we use the currently supported VLAN tag field to match
packets for sampling. We tag all our traffic and populate
it with the value from the checksum field truncated to
the tag field’s size. Since the tag field is only 12 bits and
the checksum field is 16 bits, we effectively reduce |H|
from 65535 to 4096, which we deem acceptable for our
proof-of-concept prototype and experiments.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Using our prototype and realistic traffic workloads,
we have conducted extensive experiments on a Clos
topology (a “fat-tree”). We first report on our experi-
mental setup. Following that, we report on the observed
detection times, and then discuss the throughput of
computing trajectories in SoftATS. Finally, we study the
resource overheads introduced by SoftATS.
POD 1 POD 4...
Fig. 5. Topology used for detection time, trajectory throughput and
sampling overhead experiments of SoftATS. The traffic between hosts
flows as per the arrowed and dotted line i.e., traffic flows from a host
in Pod 1 to a host in Pod 4.
A. Setup
We consider a Clos/fat-tree topology with k = 4, using
the Ripcord platform for Mininet [45], [46]. To generate
realistic network traffic, we leverage the Lawrence Liver-
more Berkeley National Laboratories (LLBNL) traffic [47]
traces. Using a custom script, we extract only the internal
subnet-to-subnet flows from the traces, then extract the
TCP checksums from those flows and replay traffic using
those checksums within our topology using tcpreplay at
100 pps as shown in Fig. 5. Considering the concepts
defined in Sec. IV, our default parameters for SoftATS are
as follows: Detectors t: 1; Packet Hashing Function h:
payload dependent; Sampling Ratio ps: 0.4%; Assign-
ment Granularity δ: 1; Redundancy: Pairwise; Average
Hash Update Rate: 2s and Hash Update Size: 2. The
number of hash assignments per switch and sampling
ratio are chosen such that every switch in the network
forms one pair with every other switch. Recall from
Sec. IV, ps =
|A(s)|
|H| . Since our topology has 20 switches,
we have |A(s)| = 20, and |H| = 4096, we get ps =∼0.4%
as the sampling ratio. In the following, we will explicitly
state any changes to the default parameters and traffic.
B. Detection Time
To validate and complement our formal analysis of
the mean detection time, we conducted a set of exper-
iments studying the detection time using real network
traffic. In particular, we evaluate our detection algorithm
(Algorithm 3) in the presence of a single attacker, and
two colluding attackers. We focus on the flow drop,
and flow injection attacks for the single attacker. For
the colluding attackers, we focus on the flow injection
attack. In both attacks (flow drop, and flow inject), we
use a static and time-varying sampling distribution for
our detection algorithm.
Setup: Since the sampling ratio impacts the detection
time, in addition to the the default parameters specified
in Sec. VII-A, we use the following: Sampling Ratio ps:
0.9% and 1.3%.
1) Single Attacker: We first describe our methodology,
results and analysis for a single attacker.
Methodology: We evaluate the effectiveness of detect-
ing the flow drop and flow injection attacks when the
attacker is the aggregate switch and when the attacker
is the core switch along a single path in our topology.
In the flow drop, the switch drops all packets from a
flow along a path. Furthermore, it reports the samples,
if any, for dropped packets. In the flow inject, the switch
injects a new flow along the path of an existing flow.
Additionally, it does not report samples for the injected
packets. Both attacks are easily emulated via OpenFlow
flow rules on OvS. We count the number of packets that
are sent in a flow till an alarm is raised by SoftATS and
then stop. We perform 100 such trials for each attack
and each attacker. We use the packet count as a metric
instead of time to remain independent of the traffic rate:
what are “realistic rates” depends on the context (e.g.,
data center vs ISP).
Results and Analysis: Fig. 6 shows the results from the
experiments. The theoretical means are represented as
solid colored lines. The box plots represent the empirical
results: the star represents the mean, and the solid red
line represents the median. First, the figure confirms our
theoretical results: the empirical results are very close
to the analytical mean for the detection time. However,
while in theory the flow inject attack takes as long as the
flow drop attack, empirically it is detected sooner. This is
possible for two reasons. First our analysis of the detec-
tion probability is conservative, i.e., we do not consider
the pairs between the attacker, and other benign switches
along the path, that can in fact help in detection. Second,
the hash assignments are not purely independent, i.e., for
the chosen sampling ratios, each switch had exactly one,
two and three pairs shared with every other switch in the
network. This increased the number of unique pairs sur-
rounding the attacker, thereby increasing the detection
probabilities. Furthermore, we observe a lot of variance
in detecting the various attacks. We suspect this is due
to the non-uniform distribution of the TCP checksum
field in the traffic used. Partridge et al. [48] measured
the performance of the TCP checksum, and identified
that for small sized packets, the distribution is skewed
for the UNIX file system. Nonetheless, based on our
experiments, the results work in favor of SoftATS. The
sampling ratio p also improves the detection, roughly
linearly: by doubling p we detect the attack in half the
expected number of packets. The position of the attacker
also influences the detection, i.e., it takes fewer packets
to detect the malicious core switch than the malicious
aggregate switch. This is due to the fact that there are
more explicit and implicit pairs surrounding the core
switch than the aggregate switch, hence improving the
detection probability. In Sec. VIII-A, we analyze the
relationship between the detection probability, the path
length, and the attacker’s position in the path.
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Fig. 6. Average no. of packets to detect the attacks at different positions
using the pairwise assignment in the static and dynamic setting with
an average update rate of 2s and an update size of 2 and varying
sampling rates.
2) Colluding Attackers: Now we describe our method-
ology, results and analysis for two colluding attackers.
Methodology: We evaluate the effectiveness of detecting
the flow injection attack (analogous to mirroring) when
two aggregate switches collude: the two switches collude
to not report samples for all packets injected. We emulate
that by modifying the specific sampling flow rules on
the two switches to not report matching packets to the
controller. In this attack, the benign traffic flows from
Pod 1 to Pod 4 (as shown in Fig. 5. However, the injected
traffic flows from Pod 1 to Pod 3. The remainder of
the methodology is the same as the single attacker in
Sec. VII-B1.
Results and Analysis: Fig. 7 shows the results from
the collusion experiment. The figure shows that for two
colluding switches not reporting samples for all injected
packets, SoftATS requires less than 1000 packets to detect
the attack. Naturally, we observe that with fewer benign
switches, it takes more packets to detect an inject attack.
Using the dynamic assignment, we observe that the
values chosen do not result in significant changes to the
detection compared to the static assignment.
C. Detection Throughput
Next, we study the number of trajectories per second
which can be analyzed in parallel, i.e., the detection rate.
Recall that SoftATS is multi-threaded (Sec. IV).
Setup: The evaluation was carried out on a 64 bit Intel
Core i7-3517U CPU @ 1.90 GHz with 4GB of RAM. We
are interested in measuring the throughput of computing
trajectories, therefore, we use multiple detector threads.
Hence, in addition to the default parameters as men-
tioned in Sec. VII-A, we use the following: Detectors t:
2, 4, 6 and 8. Note that each detector thread is an
independent thread within SoftATS, that can compute
trajectories and detect attacks.
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Fig. 7. Average no. of packets to detect a flow inject attack when
two switches collude, using the pairwise assignment in the static and
dynamic setting with an average update rate of 2s and an update size
of 2 and varying sampling rates.
Methodology: To measure the detection throughput (tra-
jectories/s) of the multi-threaded SoftATS, we record the
total time taken for a single sample to be dispatched
to its respective detector and for the detector to com-
plete the trajectory computation. Each detector thread
computes 1k trajectories, from which we compute the
mean throughput for t detector threads, which is given
by Eq. 2. We then repeat the measurements for different
CPU core counts (1, 2 and 4/hyper-Threading).
throughput =
t
mean(DispatchTime + DetectionTime)
(2)
Results and Analysis: The results obtained are shown
in Fig. 8. It is clearly evident that there is an increase
in the throughput with an increase in detector threads.
However, the throughput does not increase linearly with
the thread count and the number of cores. Nonetheless,
there is a performance improvement. Using 8 threads
and a hyper-threaded CPU, the throughput is close to
3000 trajectories/s which is ∼3 times that of using a
single thread on a single core CPU. The non-linear
increase can be attributed to the History list (see Detec-
tion Algorithm 3), where read and write operations are
synchronized. Furthermore, we suspect that: (i) ONOS
itself requires CPU cycles to manage and maintain itself
and the switches, (ii) I/O interrupts cause the operating
system to preempt SoftATS and ONOS, and (iii) the
CPU architecture used for this experiment uses hyper-
threading (Intel’s implementation of simultaneous multi-
threading), influencing the results non-deterministically.
Nevertheless, the results lend credence to the use of
multiple detection threads to achieve high detection rates
and high availability. Furthermore, the use of multiple
threads on multiple collectors can substantially increase
the detection throughput.
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Fig. 8. Comparison of SoftATS mean throughput (trajectories/s) with
varying thread counts and CPU cores.
D. Overhead of Sampling
Although SoftATS has benefits in adversarial environ-
ments, there are potential overheads. In the following
we measure and analyze the overhead of sampling at
the (ONOS) controller/collector, and the switch (OvS).
We first characterize the overhead in terms of CPU and
memory usage at the controller. Next, we measure the
overhead, if any, sampling introduces to the forwarding
throughput and latency of different sized network pack-
ets.
1) Overhead at the Controller: For overhead at the
controller, we are primarily interested in measuring
the CPU and memory utilization of SoftATS. We begin
by describing our experimental setup, followed by our
methodology, and then conclude with the results and
analysis.
Setup: We use the same system from the detection
throughput experiment for characterizing the overhead
of sampling at the controller. For SoftATS, we use the
default parameters as mentioned in Sec. VII-A.
Methodology: To characterize the CPU and memory
consumption at the collector, we first measure the re-
source consumption without SoftATS, then enable a
static configuration of SoftATS, and finally we enable
the dynamic configuration of SoftATS. In all the cases,
we replay bi-directional traffic at 100 pps between 6 pairs
of hosts, i.e., each pod receives 3 flows, for 10 minutes.
We measure the CPU and memory consumption using
top every second with the controller pinned to a single
core.
Results and Analysis: Fig. 9 shows the results. Naturally,
SoftATS does increase CPU and memory consumption
on average compared to the baseline usage. The CPU
increase is due to SoftATS dispatching a sample to the
detector thread(s) and computing the trajectory. The
memory increase by approximately 1.5 MB is due to
the data structures used by SoftATS to store and process
samples and hash assignments for switches. 50% of the
CPU usage for the static and dynamic cases is within
12-35% usage, and 50% of the memory usage is within
14-15.5 MB: both are within acceptable boundaries for
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Fig. 9. Resource consumption of SoftATS.
scenarios where SoftATS executes on a controller that
manages the network. Furthermore, the dynamic con-
figuration, even with an average update rate of 2s, does
not increase the mean CPU and memory usage by much,
compared to the static configuration. This implies that
the benefits of the dynamic configuration can be reaped
with minor overheads in terms of CPU and memory.
If SoftATS were to be used as a stand-alone system or
with multiple collectors, these overheads are very low. In
fact, as we have demonstrated previously in Sec. VII-C,
the detection throughput can be increased by using
several detector threads, and the load can be distributed
across several collectors, thereby reducing the resource
consumption on individual collectors. Hence, we see the
overhead at the controller to be a small trade-off for the
benefits of a highly parallel, distributed and performant
detection system such as SoftATS.
2) Overhead at the Switch: Having investigated the
overhead at the controller, we now measure the overhead
of sampling at the switch. The two main metrics we are
interested in here are: throughput, and latency. Using a
traffic generator and hardware timestamps, we are able
to accurately and precisely measure the impact of sam-
pling on the throughput and latency of SoftATS at the
switch. In the following, we describe our experimental
setup for evaluating the impact of sampling on the for-
warding performance. Due to our limited resources, we
evaluate the overhead using a software switch, namely,
Open vSwitch.
Setup: Since we are interested in the forwarding per-
formance of the switch when SoftATS is used, we use
one server running OvS. Therefore, the topology in
this section uses only one switch and one controller.
In addition to the default parameters from Sec. VII-A,
we use the following: Sampling Ratio ps: 0%, 0.9% and
1.3%. We only use the static assignment scheme in this
experiment. To measure the throughput and latency of
OvS, we use five systems as shown in Fig. 10. We use
a Traffic Generator—to generate specific sized packets,
Traffic
Generator Switch
Monitor
Controller
Tap TrafficSinkTap
Fig. 10. Topology used to measure the forwarding performance of
OvS.
and replay them at specific rates to OvS. OvS forwards
packets to the Traffic Sink. OvS is also connected to
the Controller via a dedicated interface. Using passive
network taps on the ingress and egress links of OvS,
we collect the traffic at the Monitor system. Except for
the Monitor, all other systems use two 2.5 GHz Dual
Core AMD Opteron CPUs with 16 GB of RAM, and
four Intel Gigabit Network Interface Cards (NICs). The
Monitor uses two dual-core 3.7 GHz Intel Xeon CPUs
with hyper-threading enabled and 16 GB of RAM. We
use an Endace DAG 10X4-P card to capture network
packets on the Monitor. Each interface of the card has
a receive queue configured with 1 GB. This provides us
with accurate, and highly precise uni-directional mea-
surements, independent of the host system’s (Monitor)
resource utilization. All the systems run Ubuntu 14.04.
For OvS, we use ovs-2.3.2 compiled using the default
configure script with gcc. OvS also has a kernel-based
fast-path, we use version: 20D84E92C1F09E01E1586EE
running on a Linux kernel version 4.6.5.
Furthermore, we configure OvS with one rule for
sampling, and one rule for forwarding, apart from the
two default flow rules installed by ONOS’s proxyarp,
and reactive forwarding application. The sampling rule
matches VLAN tags only, while the forwarding rule
matches packets based on the Ethernet source and des-
tination MAC addresses. The transmitted packets, are
UDP packets encapsulated in IP packets. Ethernet is used
to encapsulate the IP packets.
Methodology: Our objective is to measure the uni-
directional forwarding performance overhead, if any, of
OvS using our sampling scheme. Therefore, we first
measure the forwarding performance of OvS without
our scheme, i.e., Sampling Ratio ps: 0, and then with
sampling, i.e., ps: 0.4%, 0.9% and 1.3%.
To measure the throughput, we transmit a constant
stream of UDP packets at a specific rate and measure
the rate at which the stream is forwarded by OvS at
the Monitor. To unearth performance bottlenecks quickly,
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Fig. 11. Forwarding throughput of 64 byte packets for different
sampling ratios.
we use packets per second (pps) as the metric for
throughput [49]. To identify the impact of packet sizes
on the throughput, we use three packet (frame) sizes
(Bytes) based on the IEEE 802.3 Ethernet standard for
basic frames [50]: 64, 512 and 1518. For each packet size,
we transmit packets for 330 seconds at a constant rate.
We then reset the setup and change the transmit rate.
The transmit rate starts at 10 kpps and goes up to 100
kpps, in steps of 10 k.
To measure the latency, we transmit specific sized
packets and measure the time taken for OvS to forward
them. We do so for packet sizes (Bytes) based on the
Ethernet standard: 64, 128, 256, 512, 1024, 1280 and 1518.
For each trial, we send 10500 specific sized packet at 100
pps. We discard the first 500 packets to eliminate any
system artefacts.
Results and Analysis: Fig. 11, 12, and 13 show the
overhead of sampling for different sized packets. For
64 and 512 byte packets, OvS could reach 100 kpps
transmission rates, however, for 1518 byte packets, the
peak transmission rate was only 70 kpps. The results
show that for the sampling ratios chosen, the forwarding
throughput of OvS is not impacted.
Fig. 14 shows the forwarding latency of OvS for
different sized packets without and with sampling. It
is evident that sampling introduces many outliers. This
is because sampling increases the packet processing
pipeline compared to plain forwarding. When a packet
matches the sampling rule in OvS it has to go through
OvS’s slow path. Therefore, it has to go from the kernel-
space to user-space for processing. The action of sending
the packet to the controller increases the packet pro-
cessing. Lastly, the packet is matched against two tables
until it is forwarded, as opposed to only one table in the
baseline. From the figures we can also see that regardless
of sampling, for 1024 byte packets and higher, the latency
increase by roughly 25%.
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Fig. 12. Forwarding throughput of 512 byte packets for different
sampling ratios.
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Fig. 13. Forwarding throughput of 1518 byte packets for different
sampling ratios.
VIII. DISCUSSION
Our approach raises opportunities for further im-
provements, but also comes with limitations. We will
discuss some of them in more detail in the following.
A. Sampling Extension to the Edge
Our adversarial trajectory sampling scheme comes
with the fundamental limitation that the network edge
must be trusted: if a packet does not even enter the
sampling network, it is impossible to detect a routing
error related to it. For example, consider the scenario
depicted in Figure 15: As there are no sample points on
the route after the malicious ToR switch, it is impossible
to detect the mirrored packet to the malicious host.
However, the problem can be alleviated if the sam-
pling scheme is extended to the edge. For example, in
cloud management systems such as OpenStack, Open
vSwitch (OvS) is used on the virtualized servers which
is already OpenFlow enabled. Assuming that the vir-
tualized server’s host OS can be trusted, OvS (or the
networking stack on the host OS) can also participate in
our scheme to detect misbehaving ToR switches.
64B 128B 256B 512B 1024B 1280B 1518B
Packet Size
10−1
100
L
at
en
cy
(m
s)
ps=0.0% ps=0.4% ps=0.9% ps=1.3%
Fig. 14. Forwarding latency of different sampling ratios using various
sized packets at 100 pps.
Fig. 15. Detecting attacks by the top-of-the-rack switch is hard.
Fig. 16 compares the packets till detection when the
servers are used, and not used in SoftATS. We indi-
cate detecting the aggregate switch as the worst case,
and detecting the core switch as the best case. This
is because the aggregate switch has the least number
of pairs surrounding it, and the core switch has the
most number of pairs surrounding it. Clearly, there is
a benefit in using the servers with respect to detecting
attacks. The servers improve the detection time by a
factor of roughly 2x. By adding the servers to SoftATS,
the total number of switches increase from 20 to 36
which increases the explicit pairs across the network.
Furthermore, including the servers increases the number
of switches surrounding the attacker by two, thereby
increasing the detection probability.
One interesting challenge of this approach regards
how to securely connect OvS with the collector: this
connection needs to be implemented in-band, via other
(possibly) malicious (ToR) switches.
An alternative approach to extend the security to the
edge of the network could be to use a robust combiner
approach [51], [35], i.e., by leveraging physical redun-
dancy (e.g., switches of different vendors or switches
which were fabricated in different countries).
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Fig. 16. A comparison of the number of packets to detection with and
without including the edge servers in SoftATS in the best and worst
case.
B. Applying SoftATS to Other Networks
So far we have used a data center network as our
primary topology of SoftATS. We observe that SoftATS
is by no means limited to such networks. It can also
be applied to wide area networks (WAN) and service
provider networks. Admittedly, to use SoftATS in the
Internet, all nodes across end-points need to participate
in our scheme. Accomplishing this, is no small feat and
is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is still
feasible for SoftATS to be used within an administrative
domain such as an internet service provider for example.
We expect no modifications to SoftATS when used
in a service provider network with the exceptions of
obtaining centralized control, and global routing infor-
mation. In fact, we observe that using SoftATS, one can
obtain fine-grained monitoring over the network, as the
sampling can be applied at switches (L2) and routers
(L3) in unison. In addition, we expect WANs and service
provider networks to have long paths. Therefore, in
the following we analyse the relationship between the
detection probabilities and the path length using ATT’s
network topology.
The ATT network we use [52], comprises of a total
of 54 nodes with a median path length of 7 [15]. Such
a network gives us room to explore how the detection
probability and path lengths interact. This was not pos-
sible in the Clos topology we used for our evaluation.
Fig. 17 and 18, show the relationship of the detection
probability to path lengths for the worst and best case
resp. The worst case for a given path is the attacker’s
position that has the fewest pairs surrounding it, i.e.,
the node adjacent to the edge node. The best case is the
attacker’s position that has the most pairs surrounding
it, i.e., the middle node on the path. From both fig-
ures it is clear that the packets till detection and the
sampling ratio grows linearly. Furthermore, it appears
that increasing the path length reduces the packets till
detection exponentially only till a certain length beyond
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Fig. 17. A comparison of the number of packets to detection for the
worst case in ATT’s network for various path lengths.
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Fig. 18. A comparison of the number of packets to detection for the
best case in ATT’s network for various path lengths.
which there is little benefit in long paths. Nonetheless,
it shows that longer paths and more nodes, do indeed
increase the detection probability.
C. Localization Is Difficult
While our sampling scheme is useful to detect mis-
behavior, it is hard to localize a misbehaving switch.
To illustrate this, let us consider some examples. When
two switches that are far apart (e.g., the source and
destination switches on a long path), share an assign-
ment that generates an alert, it is difficult to isolate the
malicious switch: it could be any of the switches after the
source and before the destination switch. Localization is
particularly hard for injection attacks: it is difficult to
determine the misbehaving switch, if the packet is not
sampled at all the switches.
Nevertheless, each detected misbehavior gives some
clues where things went wrong. Accordingly, due to our
time-varying sampling strategy, there is always a chance
that leveraging tomographic techniques to perform lo-
calization is actually possible for a concrete event. Over
time, such patterns may become statistically significant.
D. Attacks on the Collector
SoftATS is built upon the assumption that it is hosted
on a secure system. Therefore, if an attacker compro-
mises the system that hosts SoftATS then our scheme
can be broken. Hence, appropriate measures (which are
beyond the scope of this paper) must be taken to ensure
that the system hosting SoftATS is sufficiently secured.
The availability of our scheme relies on the system(s)
running the collector(s), the link capacities between the
switches and the collector(s), etc. Indeed an attacker can
overwhelm the collector with samples and then carry
out the attack. However, there already exist measures
to deal with such problems, e.g., using redundant and
multiple collectors. By rate-limiting the samples arriving
from the switch, the collector may also be protected from
a dos attack. To ensure availability of the scheme and the
network, it is best for SoftATS to run on dedicated and
multiple controllers.
The attacker can reorder transit packet thereby influ-
ence the order of the samples reported to the collector.
If the delay in receiving the sample is beyond the
max delay, then SoftATS will throw two alerts. One drop
attack alert for the first sample and one inject attack alert
for the second sample. It will not miss detecting such an
attack.
IX. RELATED WORK
Being able to measure routes and traffic is critical
for controlling and engineering a communication net-
work [53]. Accordingly, the topic has been studied inten-
sively in the past. One generally distinguishes between
indirect and direct measurement methods. An indirect
measurement method relies on a network model and
network status information to infer the traffic route
(e.g., IGP and BGP routing state). Indirect measurement
methods suffer from the uncertainty associated with the
physical and logical state of the network. In contrast,
direct methods rely on direct observations of traffic at
multiple points in the network. Trajectory sampling [26],
[27] is an example of the latter.
Many operating systems support the traceroute and
ping [54], [55] command to display the route (path) and
to measure transit delays of packets across an Internet
Protocol (IP) network. These tools are based on active
test packet injection and are attractive for their parsimo-
nious use of data plane resources. However, it is well-
known that ping, traceroute, and counter-based solu-
tions [56] fail in adversarial settings [53]: For example,
a malicious switch may fake responses to provide the
impression that probing packets traverse the network
properly. Both active [54], [55] and passive probing [26],
[27] are vulnerable to forged reports. In general, any
adversarial behavior that can maliciously misreport sam-
ples, or delete or modify information contained in packet
headers, essentially breaks a scheme based on packet
labeling or tagging [30], [31].
Trajectory Sampling [26], [27] is a direct measurement
method based on a consistent sampling approach al-
lowing to reconstruct the path, at the collector, given
a pseudorandom subset of packets through the corre-
sponding network domain. The approach is attractive
as most switch vendors today implement some form
of packet sampling (e.g., Netflow [57]). However, while
trajectory sampling may still perform well in the context
of faulty networks [28] and networks with different
flow sizes [29], it is insufficient in non-cooperative and
adversarial environments.
Interestingly, while over the last years, much research
was conducted on how to secure routing protocols on the
control plane [1], [2], [3], [4], [58], providing authenticity
and correctness of topology propagation and route com-
putation, the important question of how to secure the
data plane has received much less attention so far. In fact,
until very recently, researchers did not know whether
it is possible to build a secure path verification mech-
anism [22]. Many existing systems like VeriFlow [59],
Anteater [60] and Header Space Analysis [23] rely either
on flow rules installed at switches or on data plane
configuration information to perform their analysis. This
information can easily be manipulated in malicious set-
tings. Providing fundamental properties like path con-
sent and path compliance [22] are usually based on
cryptographic techniques: expensive operations in high
speed networks. Even more challenging than inferring
the routes along which certain packets actually travelled
is to test where packets did not travel [61].
Goldberg et al. [53] propose an interesting approach
for end-to-end path quality monitoring; while this ap-
proach is suitable also in very general settings, it comes
at the cost of introducing extra information in packets
and requiring stronger hash functions. In an SDN setting
where communication between switches and controllers
are out-of-band and secured, opportunities for simpler
solutions such as ours are introduced.
Our approach is particularly motivated by the intro-
duction of software-defined networks. While SDNs are
known to introduce many flexibilities, also in terms of
security, they also introduce new threats. For instance,
Yu et al. [62] presented a distributed traffic monitor-
ing scheme for SDNs, and FleXam [63] is a sampling
extension for monitoring and security applications in
OpenFlow. NetSight [64] leverages SDN to trace entire
packet histories (without sampling), by collecting them
“out-of-band”, and CherryPick [65] uses packets to carry
information of SDN paths “in-band” (namely, a subset of
links along the packet trajectory); however, these proto-
cols struggle with drops and are not robust to malicious
switches. In particular, the information CherryPick adds
to the header along the path is only verified at the end
of the path. Bates et al. [66] use SDN networks (plus
some middleboxes) to observe the data plane behavior,
even in the presence of malicious switches. The traffic
engineering flexibilities of SDN have also been exploited
to perform secret sharing [67]. Zeng et al. [55] use SDN
to test the forwarding and policies in the network by
generating and actively probing the data plane across
the network.
Desai et al. [68] propose a hash-based delay sampling
technique to detect switches misforwarding packets.
Their threat model and objectives are closely related
to ours. However, their sampling scheme and detection
algorithm are different from ours. They require three
switches to sample the same set of packets and their
detection algorithm depends on the state of the switches
buffers for a chosen path. We can incorporate their
method of sampling i.e., choose triplets instead of pairs,
but our detection is based on trajectories and not switch
states.
Yu et al. [69] describe OpenSketch, a generic and
efficient sketch-based measurement framework for SDN
data planes. They developed APIs and sketches to make
generic SDN measurements alleviate the control plane
programming complexity operators face. Additionally,
they present a prototype using NetFPGA to demonstrate
the feasibility, applicability and overhead of their ap-
proach. Since their framework is designed to be parallel
to the packet processing pipeline, there is no perfor-
mance impact to the forwarding. However, matching
OpenFlow flow rules and sending samples to the con-
troller are not feasible. Nonetheless, their framework can
be modified to implement our scheme.
Bu et al. [70] introduce accurate and efficient algo-
rithms to detect and troubleshoot flow rule and flow
table faults in the data plane. They do so by using probe
packets through the data plane. This approach is vastly
different from ours. We rely on a passive approach,
therefore we do not send probe packets through the
data plane. Moreover, our objective is to detect incor-
rect packet trajectories rather than incorrect forwarding
rules and tables that may cause incorrect trajectories.
Furthermore, our threat model does not restrict the cause
for misforwarding to only flow rules and flow priorities
even though it can be used to do so.
The paper most closely related to ours is by Lee
et al. [15]. The authors present a smart generalization
of trajectory sampling where hash values are shared
between a subset of switches, rendering it hard for an
adversary to avoid detection. The authors also present a
first simulation of the possibility to detect packet drop,
modifications and substitution attacks. Our paper builds
upon this work in multiple respects. We initiate the study
of injection attacks and observe that if combined with
drop attacks, injection attacks introduce a number of
more sophisticated attacks. Accordingly, we extend and
formally and empirically analyze detection algorithm
guarantees under various misbehaviors, including injec-
tions, mirroring, rerouting, or modifications of headers
and/or payloads. Unlike prior work, our hash assign-
ment algorithm is completely random, eliminating bias
for pairs and their assigned hash values. Moreover, our
detection algorithm does not rely on an aggregation of
trajectories and counters. Instead, we use the collector’s
(controller’s) global view of the network (i.e., the net-
work policy oracle) to compute every sampled packet’s
trajectory which gives us a per sample detection accu-
racy rather than an aggregate. We demonstrate that our
detection algorithm can be parallelized using multiple
threads (and possibly multiple collectors).
In general, our work is motivated by the insight
that SDNs provide an ideal environment to implement
our algorithms, and we present an OpenFlow proto-
type accordingly. We understand SoftATS as a flexible
framework which supports a wide range of algorithms,
tailored towards their specific settings and threat models.
X. CONCLUSION
Today’s computer network routing protocols incor-
rectly assume that switches are non-malicious, and ac-
cordingly, a sufficiently large portion of the computer
network infrastructure is vulnerable to security attacks
from compromised switches, e.g., containing hardware
or software backdoors [58].
We in this paper presented a simple and light-weight
adversarial sampling approach based on the software-
defined networking paradigm, which can detect a wide
range of adversarial behaviors, and in different settings,
e.g., in the datacenter but also in the wide-area net-
work [71]. Our scheme cannot only detect packet drops,
but also packet injections, rerouting, or even packet
headers and content alterations.
Furthermore, we implemented our SoftATS in the
standard OpenFlow protocol, evaluated the prototype
in terms of detection time, and detection throughput.
We also measured the overhead introduced by SoftATS
and identified that at the controller there is a modest
increase in CPU and memory utilization. At the switch,
there is little to no forwarding overhead, making SoftATS
feasible in the real world.
We believe that our work opens several interesting
directions for future work. In particular, our framework
allows to experiment with many alternative algorithms,
which can be optimized and tailored towards specific use
cases (e.g., enterprise networks) and attacks. Moreover,
we have so far focused on detection only, and many
interesting questions for future research arise when aim-
ing at the localization and prevention of malicious nodes
and/or behaviors.
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